Control system cyber incidents, particularly those originating from even a single compromised or malfunctioning sensor system, can impact vast portions of the electric grid (or other critical infrastructures). Despite decades of lessons and warning signs, meaningful progress in securing power grid (and other critical infrastructure) control systems remains elusive. This failure stems from foundational misunderstandings […]
Could the Spanish outage occur here
Mike Swearingen and I did a webinar for the IEEE Consultants Network on the Spanish Outage and associated grid issues. The webinar can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wnk8hZEzuw. As the final results of the Spanish outage are not finalized, our discussions were based on our experience. The initial discussions were on two questions: could the Spanish […]
2025 IEEE Power & Energy Society Summit: “Achieving a more reliable and resilient energy future”
attended the IEEE Reliability and Resilience Summit May 19-21, 2025, in San Jose, CA. There were more than 300 attendees from more than 150 organizations. The program can be found at 2025 IEEE Power & Energy Society Summit – IEEE Power & Energy Society.The key takeaways were: This was an engineering conference with the attendees […]
June ICS/SCADA Cybersecurity Symposium to address real CONTROL SYSTEM cyber incidents
In preparation for the June 3-4 ICS/SCADA Cybersecurity Symposium in Chicago, I continue to be aware of CONTROL SYSTEM cyber incidents. There were no discussions of control system cyber incidents at RSA, though there were many discussions of network-related cyber events. I was recently contacted by someone trying to find public OT cyber incidents leading […]
June ICS/SCADA Cybersecurity Symposium to address unique control system cyber security issues
June 3-4, I will be participating in the ICS/SCADA Cybersecurity Symposium in Chicago. My two sessions will address important control system-unique issues not being addressed elsewhere. June 3rd, I will be moderating a first-of-a-kind session bringing together a control system engineer and an OT network cybersecurity researcher to explore the cultural and operational divide between […]
CISA “cyber hygiene” guidance for OT?
CISA that organisation that was created from the retired ICS-CERT and US-CERT came out with “Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology.[1]” In total there are 5 recommended mitigations that are quite peculiar if one remembers it has been 15 years since the announcement of the STUXNET operation. Let us look at each […]
The RSA Cybersecurity Conference is not relevant to control systems- what’s missing is in plain sight
Control system field devices have no cyber security, authentication, or cyber forensics. These devices were orphaned from cybersecurity programs as OT networks became the focus of cybersecurity programs and the RSA Cybersecurity Conference. At RSA, there were numerous discussions about network cybersecurity threats from Russia, China, and Iran, as well as on the latest APTs. […]
New IACS/OT oriented and evidence-based effort underway for improving incident management
Since leaving full time employment in 2022 I am aware that I am fading from the ICS security scene. As a way to remain useful for a while longer I have tried to fill the gap by collaborating with the ISA 99 Committee. Most recently I co-chaired one of the newly created workgroups dedicated to […]
T&D World article on Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) cyber issues
Networked Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) introduce cyber and physical vulnerabilities, and not enough attention is paid to training, design and operation. As a follow-up to my February 14, 2025 Unfettered blog, “Cyber vulnerable battery systems are catching fire and communicate directly to China”, T&D World published the update “How Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks are […]
OT and Engineering are not the same and are creating dangerous conditions
A recent job solicitation from a medium-size water utility seeking engineers included knowledge of associated industrial communications and networking equipment. However, the engineers were not responsible for cybersecurity of those networks and there was no mention of the term OT nor any consideration of with working with the network security organization. Another recent job solicitation […]