An unjustified assumption underlies the cybersecurity of manufacturing and industrial processes. You can’t be cybersecure or safe if you can’t trust your measurements. The lack of embedded cybersecurity in Level 0 devices forces a fundamental reexamination of current regulatory frameworks such as NERC CIP, ISA/IEC 62443-4-2, NIST SP 800-82, API, AWWA, NIS2, CRA, KRITIS, NEI-0809, […]
Category: Electric
After more than 18 years, Aurora is still an existential threat to critical infrastructures
Control system hardware cybersecurity issues continue to be out of the cybersecurity mainstream. Protective relay issues are an example where there are hardware cyber issues that cannot be detected by network security monitoring. These issues include manipulating registers in the relays and remotely opening and closing the relays. Aurora incidents are a good example of […]
What have we learned since Stuxnet – when it comes to control system cyber security not much
For SCADASec Fifteen years ago, I wrote the blog – “Malicious vs unintentional cyber incidents – why it is necessary to include unintentional incidents” This blog was written weeks before Stuxnet and its impact on control systems and centrifuge damage were made public. Stuxnet demonstrated that cyberattacks could be made to look like equipment malfunctions […]
NERC Sensors
The fallacy that the electric grid is cybersecure by meeting the NERC CIPs is finally being exposed. Situational awareness is based on process sensor input that is incorrectly assumed to be uncompromised, authenticated, and correct. Because process sensors use non-routable protocols, they have not been considered to be NERC Cyber Assets. Depending on the situation, […]
Does anyone tell the truth anymore?
The more important question that you might want to ask is: *who* should you trust for your information? The recent (so-called) malware attack at the Vermont electric utility on 30-Dec-2016 (Friday) demonstrates that, due to political agendas, that intelligence information may be manipulated. Throughout most of Friday, DHS (and its various departments) and FBI, hosted […]
Why won’t NERC identify control system incidents as being cyber-related?
NERC publishes Lessons Learned documents to provide industry participants with technical and understandable information that helps them maintain the reliability of the bulk electric system. NERC has a history of not identifying control system incidents as being cyber-related. NERC issued two Lessons Learned documents in 2025: “Loss of Monitoring and Control Due to a Communication […]
Control System Cyber Incidents: The Hidden Threat to Grid Stability
Control system cyber incidents, particularly those originating from even a single compromised or malfunctioning sensor system, can impact vast portions of the electric grid (or other critical infrastructures). Despite decades of lessons and warning signs, meaningful progress in securing power grid (and other critical infrastructure) control systems remains elusive. This failure stems from foundational misunderstandings […]
Could the Spanish outage occur here
Mike Swearingen and I did a webinar for the IEEE Consultants Network on the Spanish Outage and associated grid issues. The webinar can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4wnk8hZEzuw. As the final results of the Spanish outage are not finalized, our discussions were based on our experience. The initial discussions were on two questions: could the Spanish […]
2025 IEEE Power & Energy Society Summit: “Achieving a more reliable and resilient energy future”
attended the IEEE Reliability and Resilience Summit May 19-21, 2025, in San Jose, CA. There were more than 300 attendees from more than 150 organizations. The program can be found at 2025 IEEE Power & Energy Society Summit – IEEE Power & Energy Society.The key takeaways were: This was an engineering conference with the attendees […]
T&D World article on Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) cyber issues
Networked Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) introduce cyber and physical vulnerabilities, and not enough attention is paid to training, design and operation. As a follow-up to my February 14, 2025 Unfettered blog, “Cyber vulnerable battery systems are catching fire and communicate directly to China”, T&D World published the update “How Vulnerable to Cyber Attacks are […]