Control system cyber incidents are different from network cyber incidents because you can’t hide their impact: plane, trains, and ships crash, pipeline rupture, power and water are lost, etc. What is not identified is that many of these incidents have been cyber-related, and this failure to recognize them is because of a lack of appropriate […]
Category: Policy
Ford recall on a control system cyber issue
These, and other types of “subtle” control system cyber issues that do not involve Internet Protocol networks demonstrate that identifying control system incidents as being cyber-related often is not obvious. NHTSA recalled 144,500 Ford Mavericks over concerns that the rearview camera display could show frozen images while backing up. November 14, 2024, NHTSA announced that […]
Network security and engineering are still not on the same page, not even the same book
There is a continuing culture chasm between cybersecurity managed by the CISO and engineering and operations personnel responsible for OT. Part of the gap stems from many CISOs’ and their teams lack of experience and understanding of control /protection systems and devices and engineering and operations requirements and work processes. Engineering and Operations have a […]
Speaking at the American Petroleum Institute (API) Cybersecurity Conference
I will be speaking at the 19th Annual API Cybersecurity Conference November 12, 2024. The other speakers in our OT/ICS session are Saltanat Mashirova from Honeywell and Jonathan Boyett from Phillips 66. My presentation will be “Process Sensor Monitoring for Cyber Security, Reliability, and Safety”. Seven years ago, I gave a 4-hour short course on […]
OT/control system cyber security has changed and not for the better
There has been significant progress in securing IT and OT networks. However, one would expect that after 23 years, the “OT” security community would be further along in securing critical infrastructures from control system and other kinetic cyber incidents. Unfortunately, the engineers needed to safely secure control systems are generally not involved while the network […]
Sam Houston State University paper – “Who’s in charge of OT security”
The Institute for Homeland Security at Sam Houston State University published my paper –Whos_in_Charge_of_OT_Security.pdf (ihsonline.org). CISOs have traditionally been responsible for cyber security of enterprise IT networks excluding the control system (operational) assets which were under the purview of the engineering organizations. After the 2006 Gartner Research paper that coined the term “OT”, the CISOs […]
Government and industry are indifferent or unaware of critical infrastructure kinetic cyber incidents
Pagers and walkie-talkies are still used by US critical infrastructures such as power, water, and oil/gas. It appears the compromise of the Hezbollah pagers, walkie-talkies, and solar systems were supply chain attacks, somewhat akin to the Farewell Dosier attack on Gazprom in 1982. The Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies needed to be remotely actuated, making them […]
Government and industry organizations’ gaps in understanding control system cybersecurity
Cybersecurity programs assume organizations can recognize control system incidents as being cyber-related. Yet the lack of control system cyber expertise by government organizations including NTSB, FDA, FBI, TSA, EPA, CISA, and DOE have not identified control system incidents as being cyber-related. The five cases discussed were fatal catastrophes. In all cases, NTSB identified control systems […]
Critical infrastructure cyber security incident reporting is not working
Viable cyber security programs require organizations to recognize incidents as being cyber-related. That is generally straightforward for IT and OT network-based cyber incidents. However, the same can’t be said for control system cyber incidents in any sector. People in cybersecurity are comfortable with saying that insider threats (to data and IT systems) can be either […]
Follow-up: Report of another PLC compromised using cyber means
(cross-posted from the SCADASEC mailing list – posting was reply from Marina Krotofil) A couple of other friends reached out and asked for more details and more thoughts.So I wanted to add a couple more things. Note, that I do not havevisibility into the EXACT configuration of LvivTeploEnergo infrastructure,which is insanely complex as well as […]