Control system cyber incidents are real and impactful (more than 500 control system cyber incidents in the electric industry). To date, most of these incidents have not been identified as “cyber” because of lack of identified intent. When reporting and remediating a control system cyber incident, the intent isn’t as important as the impact of […]
Category: Policy
Control system cyber incidents in electric and other sectors are frequent, often impactful, but not reported
The electric and nuclear industries have required “incident” disclosure for more than 20 years. The other infrastructure sectors either have no incident disclosure requirements or only recently started such as TSA for pipelines and EPA for water. There is a significant gap between the electric industry’s reported control system cyber incidents and actual control system […]
You can’t protect the unprotectable – our critical infrastructures
Locking the door doesn’t work where there is no door. Unintentional cyber accidents or malicious cyberattacks can cause kinetic damage and there are no cyber forensics, training, or cyber security requirements for addressing these incidents. The TSA Pipeline cyber security requirements (and corresponding requirements for other infrastructure sectors) need to be more control system-focused. That […]
Regarding Dr. Aunshul Rege and her Critical Infrastructure Ransomware Dataset Repository
It has come to my attention of something that many researchers dread – someone else stealing *your* data. Though her dataset repository is free of charge, as well as publicly available, there always are individuals (and corporations) out in the world who feel that publicly-available, openly-available, and freely-available data, although free, belongs to them for […]
Comments to the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee on Process Sensor Cyber Insecurity
The DHS CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee held a conference call Thursday, March 31, 2022, that discussed current CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee activities and the Government’s ongoing cybersecurity initiatives. The meeting was for the Committee members to hear updates and discuss progress as it relates to the CISA Cybersecurity Advisory Committee’s six subcommittees: (1) Transforming the […]
It is not possible to meet Senate cyber disclosure requirements or CISA OT recommendations
I am preparing a presentation on the lack of cyber security in process sensors titled: “Shields Up and Good Cyber Hygiene Does Not Apply to Insecure Process Sensors” for a March 10, 2022 seminar. Process sensors have no inherent cyber security and yet have hardware backdoors directly to the Internet. The cyber security gap includes no […]
The OT network community cares about data; the engineering community cares about deaths
Dale Peterson has written and held podcasts on the lack of importance of Level 0,1 devices. Because Dale is so well known in the OT security community, I felt it was important to respond to what I take to be his mischaracterization of the Level 0,1 issues. The culture gap between engineering and networking can […]
Lack of applicability of NIST Special Publication 1800-32 to process sensors
As there is still confusion about the cyber security of process sensors and other Purdue Reference Model Level 0,1 field devices, I was asked to review NIST Special Publication (SP) 1800-32 “Securing Distributed Energy Resources: An Example of Industrial Internet of Things Cybersecurity” for applicability to legacy process sensors. The title of SP 1800-32 is […]
The OT paradigm is broken technically and culturally – it must be fixed
On January 26, 2022. it became evident that the OT paradigm is broken. December 29th, the article was published that more than 3,000 smart instruments in a petrochemical facility had no passwords, even by default. January 21st, SAE/MITRE held a meeting on hardware vulnerability disclosures where IOT and ICS were not addressed including for sensors […]
Cybergs sighted: course correction required for critical infrastructure protection
“Engineer Scott, please report to the bridge immediately” Frequently heard in some 1960’s era TV shows Are we being encouraged to implement the right measures for protecting the technologies used to monitor and control physical processes found in critical infrastructure or have we hit a cyberg[1]? This is the question I asked myself when first […]