Identifying control system incidents as being cyber-related is difficult. It is complicated when government and industry organizations rush to judgment by stating that incidents weren’t cyberattacks without knowing the actual cause or setting reporting thresholds that exclude many actual control system cyber incidents. Consequently, it is difficult to identify trends when so many real cases […]
Category: Unfettered
Training for identifying control system incidents as being cyber-related
Each time I provide numbers of control system cyber incidents, I get feedback from OT cyber security experts and others “demanding” detailed information. The most recent case was my comment that there have been more than 150 control system cyber incidents in water/wastewater. Because of the lack of industry being able to identify control system […]
The 2024 RSA Cyber Security Conference – what wasn’t addressed can hurt you
Critical infrastructure cyber security took a prominent position at the RSA Cyber Security Conference with the issuance of NSM22. NSM22 states: “It is diverse and complex, and includes distributed networks, varied organizational structures, operating models, interdependent systems, and governance constructs.” There was no mention of hardware. Yet the critical infrastructure is dependent on hardware – […]
The origin of “The original ICS/SCADA system cybersecurity conference”
I started the ICS Cyber Security Conference in 2002 as there were no control system cyber security conferences for the control system engineers. The Conference continued until 2014 at which time I was unable to continue the Conference due to other extensive work commitments. In 2015 SecurityWeek bought the Conference and the ICS Cyber Security […]
Could the Dali container ship incident have been a control system cyberattack – YES!
The impacts of control system incidents are obvious, but their causes are usually less clear, especially when they might be cyber-related. However, control system cyber incidents have impacted the behavior and operation of ships as well as other critical infrastructures. GPS hacks have altered ships’ positions and displays. Some Chinese critical infrastructure such as port […]
Exploiting remote access – the ultimate living off the land attack
Remote access to control systems is necessary for equipment reliability and availability. Securing remote access is a very tough problem because it is a double-edged sword providing needed reliability improvement and a potential vehicle for Living-off-the-Land attacks. Cyber security technologies exist to secure remote access from external intruders. However, cyber security programs are not adequately […]
The US electric industry is not responding to cyber-vulnerable Chinese equipment
The electric grid is interconnected. The interconnectivity goes not only between utilities but also between facilities connected to the grid. The Chinese (and other threat actors) are exploiting this cyber security gap. Chinese transformers, cranes, inverters, process sensors, etc. are comparably well-made and inexpensive leading to their continued use in US critical infrastructures. Many of […]
False process sensor data can be catastrophic, but are not adequately addressed
The impetus for this blog was twofold: first, a Concordia University study dated January 24, 2024, which concluded that tampering with the electric system sensors could cause grid fluctuations, and second, my meeting with the engineer who scientifically documented that the radiation monitoring system outside the Chernobyl nuclear plant was compromised with false data. The […]
IEEE Computer article on identifying control system cyber incidents
The article “There Is No Chilling When Your Control System Cybersecurity Is Unfulfilling” is in the December 2023 issue of IEEE Computer magazine. The article discusses the importance of identifying control system incidents as being cyber-related as the identification is the starting point for cyber incident response programs. The example in the article is the shutdown of […]
Why is CISA not addressing the PLCs in the Unitronics PLC attack?
The Unitronics PLC hack is an Iranian IRGC supply chain attack against multiple US critical infrastructures on US soil (it has also affected international users) targeting the Israeli-made Unitronics PLCs through its customers. The CISA response has been less than satisfactory as this was an attack against the PLCs whereas CISA’s recommendations only addressed IT […]